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ABSTRACT
This article offers a  perspective on the study of the connections between neo-
Eurasianism and Meridionalism. Its main argument is that there exists a possible 
tendency of Meridionalism becoming an instrument of neo-Eurasianism – and 
by extension of Russian national interests – in Latin America. Although Russian 
interference in Brazil is not new, the bonds between Meridionalism and neo-
Eurasianism may now assume a clearer than ever aspect in strategic terms between 
the two countries. It is also noteworthy that both those formulations came from 
academia. 
There is a particular logical inconsistency to be pointed out within Meridionalism: 
either an ideological purpose overcomes geostrategic goals or the opposite. In order to 
solve that problem, the article is structured in two parts: a short look at the Brazilian 
School of Geopolitics’ cores and the comparative analysis of Meridionalism and neo-
Eurasianism. 
The theoretical and methodological framework is linked to the realist theoretical 
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Artículos y ensayos tradition (positivism), with a mixture of geopolitical studies approach and strategic 
planning framework. Geopolitical studies simply provide the tools to explain the 
Brazilian School of Geopolitics’ ideas and to identify geopolitical factors within 
the strategic plans. Together with strategic planning, the comparative analysis of 
Meridionalism and neo-Eurasianism, as strategic plans, is accomplished. 
KEYWORDS: geopolitical studies, Meridionalism, neo-Eurasianism, realism, foreign 
policy. 
RESUMEN 
Este artículo ofrece una perspectiva sobre el estudio de las conexiones entre el 
neo-eurasianismo y el meridionalismo. Su argumento principal se basa sobre una 
posible tendencia de que el meridionalismo se convierta en un instrumento del 
neo-eurasianismo – y por extensión de los intereses nacionales rusos – en América 
Latina. Aunque la interferencia rusa en Brasil no es nueva, los vínculos entre 
meridionalismo y neo-eurasianismo pueden ahora asumir un aspecto más claro en 
términos estratégicos entre los dos países como nunca antes. También cabe destacar 
que ambas formulaciones provienen de la academia.
Hay una incoherencia lógica particular que debe señalarse en el meridionalismo: 
o bien el objetivo ideológico supera los objetivos geoestratégicos o bien lo contrario. 
Para resolver este problema, la estructura del artículo se compone de dos partes: 
una breve mirada a los núcleos de la Escuela Brasileña de Geopolítica y el análisis 
comparativo del meridionalismo y neo-eurasianismo.
El marco teórico y  metodológico está vinculado a  la tradición teórica realista 
(positivismo), con una mezcla de enfoques de estudios geopolíticos y de la estructura 
de planificación estratégica. Los estudios geopolíticos facilitan las herramientas para 
explicar las ideas de la Escuela Brasileña de Geopolítica e identificar los factores 
geopolíticos dentro de los planes estratégicos. Junto con la planificación estratégica, se 
realiza el análisis comparativo del meridionalismo y neo-eurasianismo, como planes 
estratégicos.
PALABRAS CLAVE: estudios geopolíticos, meridionalismo, neo-eurasianismo, 
realismo, política exterior.
INTRODUCTION
The main objective of this article is to identify links between neo-Eurasia-
nism as Russian strategic plan and Meridionalism as Brazilian strategic plan . 
The article argues that the hypothesis of Meridionalism being used by neo-
Eurasianism in a global modality of action is confirmed and it is sustained that 
such scenario will continue in the future if major changes do not occur .
The article’s structure is divided into two parts: a  very brief description 
of the Brazilian School of Geopolitics’ cores in order to identify the prescrip-
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tion of “continentalization directive” as predominant idea, which will be later 
found in Meridionalism; and a more thoughtful analysis of neo-Eurasianism 
and Meridionalism demonstrating converging positions and objectives, and 
making the argument of the subordination of the latter to the previous one .
As for the theoretical perspective, the article is positioned in the positivist 
sphere and inscribed in the realist theoretical tradition, putting forward a mixed 
approach of geopolitical studies with strategic studies . Particularly in respect 
to the latter, the discipline of strategic planning offers suitable instruments 
that were used extensively . The sources of the research were mainly books, 
papers, chapters and conferences/oral communications by main authors of the 
Brazilian School of Geopolitics, neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism .
Cores in the Brazilian School of Geopolitics
Mário Travassos’ work – the first one formulating a study in the geopolitical 
sphere in Brazil – can be systematized in three general postulates, which are 
still useful today in geopolitical analysis: a) states tend to control the entire 
area of a river basin as well as the mouth of the river; b) states aim to have se-
veral accesses to the sea and when it is possible to different seas; c) states tend 
to dominate “routes” that eventually can be used for state’s power projection . 
Travassos focused on infrastructures, communication lines, strategic planning 
and centralization . 
Departing from that series of ideas, the Brazilian School of Geopolitics 
concentrated on: territorial integration and defense of national territory, di-
plomatic cooperation with other South-American countries (especially from 
the southern cone), and prestige enlargement in continental terms .
Mattos, the classic author, summarized the Brazilian School of Geopolitics 
in the following points (Meira Mattos 2011: 208): a) the idea of empire while 
considering the dimension of the territory; b) the necessity of territorial co-
lonization/integration (state’s relative potential); c) development and defense 
of the Amazon region;3 d) strategic position of Brazil in the South Atlantic; e) 
aeronautic development is essential to Brazil’s territorial integration; f) econo-
mic, social, scientific and technological development policies are imperative; 
g) Brazil has sufficient conditions to become a great power; h) in order to dis-
suade international ambitions, Brazil needs strong armed forces; i) competent 
diplomacy is vital to pursue national aspirations and objectives .
Hence, those points could be systematized into the following objectives: 
protection of the North, Brazilian presence in Antarctica, the idea of South 
Atlantic Pact (Miyamoto 1987: 7) . The danger of an attack, foreign penetration 
in the Amazon area is recurrent too (Meira Mattos 2011: 220) .
3  It is noteworthy the existence of a very recent study on this topic by the Secretaria de As-
suntos Estratégicos da Presidência da República (Gheller et al. 2015) .
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continentalization strategy (Travassos and Meira Mattos predominantly) (see: 
Morgado 2016) . Apt to be characterized as “classical geopolitics”, the Brazilian 
School of Geopolitics formulated recommendations to the political power, of 
which the most recurrent one was to focus on the continentalization dyna-
mics . Meridionalism continued de facto such state-of-things, although there 
are inconsistencies to be pointed out .
Comparative analysis of Meridionalism  
and neo-Eurasianism
Although the order of words in the title and subtitle presented Meridionalism 
in the first place – since the article is devoted to the role of the position of Brazil 
concerning two strategic plans – due to the following facts: neo-Eurasianism 
anticipated Meridionalism in the line of time, and neo-Eurasianism is richer 
in theoretical terms (thus, neo-Eurasianism helps understand Meridional-
ism), neo-Eurasianism will be analyzed first and Meridionalism afterwards . 
Fundamental lines of neo-Eurasianism as strategic plan
After explaining the cores of the Brazilian School of Geopolitics, this section 
shall start by stating that neo-Eurasianism is not only a strategic plan but also 
an ideology, since, for example, it misuses geopolitical concepts in favor of the 
primary goal of achieving power .
Yet, leaving ideology aside, the next research step shall focus on what neo-Eu-
rasianism presents as “ideal” New World Order and how neo-Eurasianism intends 
to implement the changes to reach that “final stage”, i.e. which tactics have been 
designed by its major proponent, the Russian author Aleksandr Dugin .
Map 1. 
The West as target by 
Dugin (2000: 217)
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Right from the beginning of this section, it will be demonstrated that the 
very first modality of action of neo-Eurasianism, as a strategic plan, is to gather 
as much support as possible against the West and, most of all, against the U .S .A .
With both neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism perceived as strategic 
plans, the study will, therefore, be able to decompose two phases within them, 
with the assistance of strategic planning framework . 
The first phase of strategic planning4 requires the analysis of the environ-
ment: an internal analysis (identifying strengths and weaknesses) and an ex-
ternal analysis (naming the opportunities and threats, i.e. SWOT analysis) . 
The second phase is composed of the formulation of the plan, which includes: 
the definition of the mission, the enumeration of objectives, setting up mo-
dalities of action and linking the plan to specific sectoral policies . These two 
phases are covered by neo-Eurasianist and Meridionalist strategic plans, as the 
study will verify in detail .5
Phase I. Analysis of the international environment by neo-Eurasianism
The geopolitical approach concerns the international environment primarily, 
but not exclusively . However, due to space limitations of this article, the analy-
sis of the internal environment will be left aside . 
In general – and focused mainly on the international arena anyway – Du-
gin has begun his books, articles, interviews, conferences, broadcasts devoted 
to explaining his – that is neo-Eurasianist – Weltanschauung with the image 
that the U .S .A ., “the American Empire”, is collapsing and that the “unipolar 
world” will soon cease to exist . This “American Empire” or “unipolarism”, Du-
gin explained, comprises several dimensions . The World Order is unipolar 
and the U .S .A . is the core of the unipolarity . This unipolarity is: a) geopolitical 
– dominance of the globe by the U .S . imperialism that established a kind of 
”global dictatorship”; b) ideological – “…based on the Modernist and Post-
Modernist values…”; c) spiritual – it is the “…kingdom of the Antichrist” 
(Dugin 2011) . Consequently, Dugin labeled a “…USA-centric global geopo-
litical field…” that assumes impact in several domains: historically – the U .S . 
conception of Western Civilization’s climax; politically and ideologically – the 
spread of liberal democracy throughout the world; economically – the U .S .A . 
expands its economy worldwide, uses military invasions to assist in that pro-
cess, and that expansion is only limited by the Chinese economic strength and 
the monopoly of resources by Russia, Iran and Venezuela (Dugin 2011) . In 
another source, Dugin criticized the Western anthropological individualism, 
4  Elsewhere the author explained with detail strategic planning’s phases, also providing an 
application of that model on the empirical reality (Morgado 2015) .
5  The other two phases of strategic planning: operationalization, and evaluation and control 
– as future events as a whole – shall be for that reason put aside .
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market economy, democracy as the rule of minorities [sic], the middle class as 
the only really existing social actor and universal norm, one-world globalism 
(world citizenship) (Dugin 2014a: 295) .
So all these claims have been organized into a compact bloc of ideas in or-
der to denounce that the U .S .A . are pursuing “… the promotion of ‘universal’ 
values reflecting the values of Western world (liberal democracy, parliamen-
tarism, free market, human rights and so on)” (Dugin 2011) . Upper bourgeois 
class is the dominant class in a financial and industrial imperialism, imposing 
“…a kind of ‘global imperial network’ operating on a planetary scale” (Dugin 
2011) and that – this is a vital point – the U .S . move towards “world domina-
tion” accomplishing it at Russian expense (Dugin 2014a: 125) .
Therefore, one has now Dugin’s picture of the World Order and one can 
summarize: the West rules under the U .S . command, and rules over a mul-
titude of states – including Russia – that can barely resist to this supremacy . 
The situation is then unfair and should change as soon as possible, Dugin 
concluded .
With the purpose of covering this approach with more respectable jus-
tification, a misuse of the geopolitical approach was brought .6 In the pure 
Manichean division, Russia and its allies are identified with reactionary tel-
luropolitics, and the U .S .A . and its allies, including NATO, are identified 
with imperialistic thalassopolitics . Nevertheless, the highest respectability 
comes with duginist moral standards: the West is the “evil” and Eurasia is 
the “good” .
Using process tracing, it is possible to infer that Dugin’s analysis of the 
external environment and his “refusal of the West”7 is mainly based on the 
criticism of a single book: The Open Society and Its Enemies by Karl Popper 
(Dugin 2006: 131–134) . Ignoring the fact that judging a whole civilization 
by one book only is nothing but a dishonest approach, a non-scientific one, 
Dugin’s misguided approach is moreover revealed while recognizing an al-
legedly “American imperialism” (free world, crusade for democracy, Atlantic 
solidarity), paying no attention to the opposing values that, being also part 
of the West, react against Dugin’s picture, e.g. aspects of classic Greek phi-
losophy, some Roman law principles, Christianity itself, so many political 
thinkers (e.g. de Maistre, Fortunato, Cortes, Kirk), generals, philosophers; 
values expressed in all cultural dimensions, from architecture to music, 
painting, etc .) .
One of the biggest problems in Dugin’s approach lies in his definition 
of globalization . Dugin has been confusing definitions . He does not use an 
6  Namely misusing concepts such as: (1) Heartland; (2) Thalassopolitics and Telluropoli-
tics, i.e. a “clash Sea vs Land” (3) Pan-Regions and Civilizations .
7  “I am resolutely against the Western values…” – Alexandr Dugin (2011) .
169
Assessing the role of Brazil  
in the New World Order: 
A geopolitical study 
of Meridionalism and  
neo-Eurasianism
Nuno Morgado
academic definition of unipolar world8, but instead he has been using the 
“unipolar world” expression as unilateralism, in the sense that “the U .S . does 
everything it wants” . Hence, the intentions in this attitude cannot be other 
than ideological .
Phase II. Formulation of strategic plan by neo-Eurasianism
The formulation of the mission guarantees the unity of the whole strategic 
plan . National survival, territorial integrity and people’s welfare put together 
the mission of the regular and efficient state’s structure . 
As for the official mission of neo-Eurasianism, its supreme command can 
be recognized in the destruction of the “unipolar world” . Hypothetically, this 
mission should be accomplished through the creation of multipolarity – i.e. 
Russia is unable to create a unipolar order, not even able to sustain the old bipolar 
order, multipolarity is the only possible comfortable and affordable solution .
Having already presented Dugin’s despise for the “Roman-German 
civilization” and its “universalism” (Dugin 2014b: 18), Western hegemony 
must then be exterminated . Dugin presented his theses interrelated with 
the mission though (Dugin 2006: 55–59): a) the West needs to be saved; b) 
Russia is a specific civilization that not only needs to be saved too, but also 
developed (against Americanization); c) strengthening of a Russian strategy, 
e.g. improving Russian economy .
At this level appears the following doubt: is the destruction of the “unipolar 
world” the true neo-Eurasianist mission only, or does that mission embrace 
the destruction of the U .S .A . as a country too? KGB-trained scholar Panarin, 
also a proponent of a continental Eurasian bloc, formulated the hypothesis of 
U .S . dismantle, a prediction that was not confirmed by Panarin’s own deadline 
of 2010 (Scalea 2009) . Yet, the project (or aspiration) has not been vanished 
or repudiated . 
How is the mission divided? Certainly into a  list of objectives: the official 
creation of “multipolarity” or great spaces on the international chessboard 
(assessed as fake); being inferred the true objective on establishing Russia as major 
great power with a very strong supremacy over the old Soviet space, adding series 
of strong alliances with several countries – an oligarchic global order .
The systematization of objective follows the pattern of the official neo-
Eurasianist analysis of the environment, i.e. the foundations of project lays 
in the rejection of Atlantism, NATO, and the US-led globalization . The main 
point is allegedly raising a multipolar world of “four great spaces” headed by 
four director-states: Russia, Germany, Japan, and the U .S .A . Naturally, Russia 
8  For example: “a distribution of measurable capabilities among states such that there is 
only one super power”, one state only is “above the rest in terms of basic capabilities” – those are 
William C . Wohlforth’s statements (Johns Hopkins 2015) (Wohlforth 1999: 7) .
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some countries (e.g. secession of Turkey, Azerbaijan or China and absorption 
of Finland by Russia) .
Whereas the mission and the objectives constitute what is to be achieved, 
the modalities of action compose the directives on how to accomplish it . 
It was already pointed out that gathering the greatest number of U .S . 
enemies and opponents is the neo-Eurasianist main modality of action . Based 
on Leninist-Gramscian teachings, Dugin (2011) explained that: 
•	 “…[he] is radically against American hegemony and world domination 
[…] against globalism and proposes the doctrine of multipolarity . [He is] 
in favor of the common struggle of Russians, Muslims, Asians and Latins 
against the countries of Rich North” . 
•	 “Movements against the U .S . world-leadership: (1) Global Caliphate and 
the radical Islam; (2) neo-socialism movement (e .g . Venezuela, Bolivia, 
[Brazil]); Eurasian project, i.e. multipolarity… based on the principle of 
civilizations and great spaces” . 
•	 “…who challenge the present state of things, the globalization and the American 
imperialism are virtually friends and allies. Let our ideals be different but we 
have in common one very strong thing: the present reality that we hate” .
Hence, one has a great heterogeneity among numerous allies . The expressions 
“Third Rome, Third Reich, Third International” (Dugin 2016a) may give a more 
precise idea about the incompatibility among the allies that are brought together 
solely on the grounds of common hostility towards the U .S .A . and the West .
Dugin has been presenting modalities of action based on sophisticated 
techniques of subversion, destabilization and disinformation, masterminded 
by the Russian intelligence community . In this sense, Dugin affirmed that only 
the army and the secret services possess a  real sense of patriotism (Dugin 
2008), something that Dugin certainly knows very well, taking into account 
his family origins linked to arcana imperii for generations, i.e. to GRU/KGB . 
Map 2. 
Dugin’s Eurasian Empire 
(Dugin 2000: 415)
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However, concerning the Armed Forces, in the neo-Eurasianist modalities of 
action military operations play relatively little role, while the use of resources 
(i.e. a  geopolitical factor), for example, natural gas or oil, is seen as a  vital 
weapon for pressuring other states . In this regard, the modality of action 
should in extremis achieve the point of making all of Europe captive of Russian 
resources .
In this context, an aggressive and radical foreign policy conducted mainly 
by secret services is the issue at stake in a manner of: working for Eurasian 
integration; and encouraging the foundation of “great spaces” and alliances 
between them and Russia .
Working for Eurasian integration is based, before anything else, on 
Russia’s position in the middle of Eurasian mass land .9 Russia should make 
the unification of all “Russian territory” and find its true dimension, Dugin 
assumed . In fact, the Empire is one of the goals for neo-Eurasianism .10 
The foundation of “great spaces” and bilateral alliances between them and 
Russia is another modality of action for neo-Eurasianism . Against the logics 
that different peoples have different national interests, Dugin projected the 
construction of four “great spaces” (as once four Haushofer’s pan-regions): 
a) the American Continent (Monroe doctrine led by the U .S .A .); b) Euro-
Africa, headed by “Central Europe”; c) Russian Central-Asian zone, headed 
by Russia; and d) the Pacific zone, headed by Japan (Dugin 2014b: 47–49) .
9  For a  reading about Russia’s position from the geopolitical point of view see: Michael 
Romancov (2006) .
10  “An Empire in Place of a National State” – Dugin (2014a: 63–67) .
Map 3. 
Dugin’s multipolar World 
Order (four zones) (Dugin 
2000: 235)
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Union, Eurasian Union, Islamic Union, the South-American Union11, Chinese 
Union, the Indian Union, Pan-Pacific Union, the North-American great space 
(Dugin 2011), in which economic, military and political partnership should 
prevail (Dugin 2014b: 49) .
Besides that, another core of the modality of action under study is 
comprised by the idea of axes . Dugin presented three of them: the Moscow – 
Berlin Axis (Dugin 2000: 220–229), the Moscow – Tokyo Axis (Dugin 2000: 
229–238), and the Moscow – Teheran Axis (Dugin 2000: 238–246) .
Eurasian “…temporary allies (Islamists, Latin America anti-colonialists, 
neo-socialists and ‘independistas’ and so on)” (Dugin 2011) also have their 
place . Dugin admitted to neutralize those alliances later on – in the line of 
Leninist-Gramscian dialectic . 
In the Third World, Russia should stimulate integration projects among 
the countries under great powers allied with Russia, Dugin clarified (Dugin 
2006: 28) . At this point, Brazil, São Paulo Forum and Latin America regional 
integration enters the topic .
So, what about Brazil? What about its relevance in the Neo-Eurasianist 
strategic plan? 
Before the debate between Dugin and Brazilian philosopher Olavo de 
Carvalho, which took place in 2011, one cannot find major references from 
Dugin – or from the neo-Eurasianist movement in general – to Brazil, or even 
to Latin America . Therefore, it might be argued that the incorporation of the 
region in the neo-Eurasianist strategic plan has been recent .
Nevertheless, Russia’s – and before Russia the Soviet bloc’s – interest 
in Brazil dates back in time, and this constitutes a  topic that has not been 
11  This study understands that São Paulo Forum and South America regional integration 
represent that political process .
Map 4. 
Dugin’s ‘Multipolar World: 
Four Zones – Large Spaces’ 
(Dugin 2014b: 58)
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properly analyzed by the literature in political science either . Several former 
intelligence agents from the Soviet bloc exposed USSR’s influence in Brazil . 
Pacepa, a  former Securitate (Romanian communist secret police) three-star 
general, confessed that liberation theology was originated directly from 
Khrushchev’s goal of attaining influence over Latin America . This means that 
for reaching that goal, the KGB elaborated and used liberation theology to 
pursue communist infiltration in Brazil’s Catholic Church, destroying true 
Catholic doctrine in this way (Pacepa 2015) .
Former StB operative (Státní bezpečnosti – Czechoslovak communist 
secret police) Ladislav Bittman12 – who, like Pacepa, defected to the U .S .A . – 
admitted in his book that in February 1964, StB was responsible for creating 
fake documents released in Brazilian mass media, stating that the U .S .A . was 
preparing an intervention in Brazil and that many CIA, FBI, DOD agents 
were already deployed in the country (Bittman 1985) – an example of pure 
disinformation .
Mauro Abranches has been studying documentation at The Institute for 
the Study of Totalitarian Regimes in Prague and disclosed that StB TORO 
operation, launched in Brazil against the U .S . ambassador Thomas Clifton 
Mann (1912–1999), fabricated facts and forged documents, spreading them in 
Brazilian mass media . Abranches proved from the documents that roughly 31 
operations were launched in Brazil by StB/KGB (Magalhães 2014a)13, confirming 
Bittman’s explanations . Nevertheless, until now and against all empirical data, 
the narrative that 1964 political disturbance in Brazil was caused by the U .S .A . 
remains solid in leftist Brazilian mass media and academia .
Furthermore, in the documentary “Soviet Subversion of the Free World 
Press”, former KGB agent Yuri Bezmenov (Freeman 2014) – who, like Pacepa 
and Bittman, also defected to North America (in his case to Canada) – 
explained in detail the techniques for ideological brainwashing used on foreign 
diplomats, journalists, poets, intellectuals and editors resident or visiting 
Moscow,14 providing even stronger support to the previous descriptions . From 
this short review, one infers that USSR/Russia was and still is perfectly aware 
of Brazil’s potential as a target .
Coming back to the present and to neo-Eurasianism, one can observe the 
continuation of the pattern of Russia’s interest in Brazil . In the mentioned debate 
with Carvalho, Dugin even compared Brazil with Russia as culture-mixed 
12  Ladislav Bittman was the same agent who was involved in the 1964 disinformation 
operation (Operation Neptune), forging fake Nazi documentation, planting that documentation 
on the bottom of Black and Devil’s Lakes in southern Czechoslovakia, and then recovering it 
publicly in order to harm the image of the West, particularly Federal Republic of Germany, 
fomenting anti-Nazi hysteria and creating internal problems in the free world . This operation 
even made some people – whose names were mentioned in the fake documents – commit 
suicide . Bittman confessed these crimes in an interview (Fdfrankify 2012) .
13  For other StB operations in Brazil see: Magalhães (2014b) and Abranches and Petrilák (2016) .
14  For example, among many others, a Brazilian journalist recruited by the KGB: ABI (2009) .
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The objective is then revealed – stimuli for increasing the degradation of relations 
between Brazil and the U .S .A ., which Dugin called “independence” (Dugin 2011) . 
From this premise, the question arises: if Brazil has a  specific identity as 
Dugin (correctly) said, then how can Brazil be merged in a Latin American 
Groβraum without damaging this identity, which neo-Eurasianism states it is 
aiming to protect? The answer is obvious: the priority is not Brazil’s identity, but 
the construction of a Latin America “greater space” that can become an instru-
ment of the neo-Eurasianist strategic plan . The text will insist in this argument .
Dugin prepared a mental terrain for planting his seeds:
As far as I understand, Brazilian society and Brazilian culture are not 
fully Western and individualistic. […] the main features of Brazilian cultural 
[critical] attitude towards USA. […] Being critical in front of USA and the 
Western civilization as a whole, I  find a  lot of very charming [Eurasian] 
features in the South and Central American societies. […] It seems that Latin 
America is more and more inclined to choose the alternative approaching the 
Eurasian and Arab camps (Dugin 2011) .
Neo-Eurasianist think tank Katehon declared that Brazil’s “geopolitical 
balance is 70% Eurasianist and 30% Atlanticist” (Katehon 2016) . Although 
there is no information about which methodology was used to get this result, 
all the quotes and the mentioned empirical data converge to the cited modality 
of action: the unification of Latin America into a single bloc .
If doubts resist, one shall confirm directly in another Dugin’s writing: 
Dugin advised directly for “the integration of Latin American countries into 
Central and South American Great Spaces” (Dugin 2014: 75, Laos 2015: 
160) and identified Latin America in general as a Großraum, a Greater Space 
(Dugin 2016b) . Naturally, this is a mistake, since Brazil, contrary to the rest 
of Latin American countries, is a  Portuguese-speaking country, thus with 
a different culture . But to Dugin that is a non-important detail in the whole 
strategic plan . Moreover, on the one hand, Dugin promised Latin America to 
the U .S . control (Monroe doctrine) whereas, on the other hand, Dugin asserts 
that Brazilians should fight against the U .S .A . This confusion corresponds to 
the contradictions of revolutionary dialectics .
Bringing Parvulesco – a  late friend and collaborator of Dugin’s – to the 
analysis, he also formulated plans concerning the region under study . Latin 
America – Parvulesco called it, not incorrectly, “Roman America” – can be 
a  gateway for the Eurasian project against the U .S .A ., in the same way that 
China – Parvulesco said – is a gateway within the “Great Eurasian continent” in 
favor of the U .S .A . (Parvulesco 2005: 285) . In this way, the use (in the Leninist-
Gramscian sense) of South America by the Eurasian project is highly favored 
by the Latin America integration – Parvulesco admitted it openly, revealing the 
unity in the neo-Eurasianist modalities of action (Parvulesco 2005: 286–288) .
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If, in terms of political reality, Brazil has been buying military equipment 
from Russia – like aerospace defense equipment (Lulko 2013) – under an 
agreement signed in 2008 (in Lula da Silva’s time in office), further political 
connections (BRICS, special talks, etc .) cannot be surprising either . “So, the 
national States lack the vision, and movements lack sufficient infrastructure to 
put their ideas in practice”– Dugin prescribed (2011) . 
In Latin America, the regional integration process, which enchants neo-
Eurasianism so much, has a  directive strategic body: the São Paulo Forum . 
Unfortunately this topic must be postponed for another research, due to its 
complexity . Yet it had to be mentioned due to its relevance in the power network .
In conclusion, Brazil has not been ignored by neo-Eurasianism . On the 
contrary, since at least 2011, Dugin has been elaborating on the importance 
of Brazil and Latin America for his strategic plan . The role of Meridionalism 
and the conduct of politics in South America are both instruments that neo-
Eurasianism can use, in order to achieve its mission .
The Phase II is ended by 4 sectoral politics . Much could be explained at 
this level, but for the sake of shortness of the text, only two aspects shall be 
highlighted, for their direct connection to the geopolitical factors .
Firstly, neo-Eurasianism, in the quality of a totalitarian ideology, provides 
a  program for all human dimensions: from housing to health, passing by 
culture, religion, finance and, of course, politics and economy .
Secondly, the subject of police/secret service-state, the agent par excellence 
of neo-Eurasianism . If doubts about the totalitarian and police-oppressive-
state character of neo-Eurasianism persist, Dugin’s idea that the new Eurasian 
elite need to rotate from “parallel hierarchies” to an “Oprichnina” – that means 
to praise the formation of another secret service or a secret police body – may 
be borne in mind (Dugin 2014: 183–187) . 
Therefore, Dugin captured geopolitical concepts and theories, imposed 
them as a  necessity and created a  strategic plan for achieving objectives . 
The enemy was identified – the U .S .A . and the West – and then the destruction 
of their hegemony in the world was crystallized in the mission . For Dugin, 
Russia’s security depends on the expansion of Russian borders towards the 
West and the South, so the main modality of action – a new global anti-U .S . 
(anti-West by extension) alliance – needs to help in that expansion, too .
Dugin accused the Americans of building a New World Order (Dugin 
2014: 48) – so it was his final analysis of the external environment . Yet, 
it is noteworthy reminding that it was Dugin himself who designed a plan 
for a  New World Order . That New World Order should impose ways of 
life, promote oppressive control ending freedoms and destroying countries . 
A typical totalitarian plan, already seen in the past, is back .
Consequently, neo-Eurasianism does not constitute a  geopolitical study 
that tries to explain political reality, but neo-Eurasianist proponents spread 
instead an ideology that, while using geopolitical concepts and methods, aims 
indeed to shape a New World Order through a  clearly elaborated strategic 
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world power, within a final oligarchic-global order . How Brazil is helping on 
this project is to be analyzed right away .
Fundamental lines of Meridionalism as strategic plan 
It is believed that André Martin, professor of Political Geography at São 
Paulo University, is Brazil’s most prominent author regarding the intellectual 
formulations on “geopolitics” . Therefore, it is worthy to introduce Martin’s 
Meridionalism and to analyze it in the English language for the first time (as it 
is perceived in the limits of the state of the art of my own research) .
Martin asserted that his Meridionalism is a ‘geo-ideology’ – a term coined 
by Martin himself – whose central target is to grant, in the international 
chessboard, a  special place to Brazil (Dugin 2014c) . For that, naturally, the 
structure of international power must be changed, Martin contended . Hence, 
there is not much to add in terms of classification of Meridionalism as ideology, 
since the author himself already regarded it as such . 
As for the understanding of how the power shift in the international 
arena should occur, it is required to analyze Martin’s Meridionalism within 
the framework of strategic planning, as it was accomplished above for neo-
Eurasianism .
Devoting himself to the study of geopolitics – understood by him in the 
limits of applied geopolitics exclusively (in the line of Couto e Silva) – Martin, 
in his PhD thesis, tried to define the basic concepts of the field: “space” and 
“power”, clarifying that while space is different from territory, power is nothing 
but a  capacity (Martin 1993) . Martin also wrote an entire and interesting 
chapter about the concept of borders (Martin 1993: 75–94) .
Concerning other concepts, however, it is considered that the definitions 
and distinctions among other concepts/fields of study are primitive .15 Martin 
mentioned the debate on the divisions among geopolitics and political 
geography (Martin 1993: 30), which has also remained too rudimentary in 
Brazil, taking into account that Martin insisted, in his 2007 habilitation thesis, 
that political geography and geostrategy are synonyms (Martin 2007: 8, 15) . 
The literature in geopolitical studies advanced much about that topic even 
before 2007 (e.g. Chauprade and Thual 1998) . 
Meridionalism – Martin’s major design – has become the center of his 
work, it might be argued . That ‘geo-ideology’ has been taking shape for the 
last twenty years (Martin 2007: I, Dugin 2014c) . 
15  In fact, it continues being so, i.e. the primitive knowledge has endured in Brazil . In an 
article in 2014, Albuquerque – one of the few Brazilian academics interested in geopolitics – used 
the terms “theory” and “ideology” to characterize Meridionalism, as if they had the same mean-
ing (Albuquerque 2014) .
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The ideology departs from the concept of Meridionalidade, a  concept 
that is characterized, Martin explained, not only by economic and military 
fragility, but mainly by political and diplomatic limited relevance (Martin 
1994: 113) . In terms of position (Lage – geopolitical factor), the ideology 
focuses on the location in the “South” of the globe (Martin 1994: 114) . In fact, 
that is a crucial condition at stake since the origin of the name (Meridional) 
can then be traced here . 
The main point, that should be always kept in mind, is that Meridionalism 
is an ideology which – stressing the condition of Meridionalidade – 
establishes the objective of pursuing “hemispheric cooperation” and 
exercising “international solidarity”, based on the Westphalian principle of 
states equality (Martin 1994: 117) . The rhetoric is characteristically a  piece 
of Marxist structure with normative purposes that is unable to describe the 
reality objectively, since the “international solidarity” will necessarily destroy 
the Westphalian principle of national sovereignty (in this level, the case of São 
Paulo Forum is paradigmatic) .
As ideology, Meridionalism is far from the richness of neo-Eurasianism, 
which has been trying to gather conservatives, Christians, Muslims, radical 
leftists, hardline communists, fascists, revolutionaries, etc . with a  catch-all 
objective: the destruction of the “U .S . hegemony” . As for Meridionalism, it 
is a plain leftist ideology based on the determinist Marxist call: “Meridionals 
from all the World, unite!” . Therefore it seems that there is not much more to 
be analyzed in terms of roots of the ideology under examination, so the study 
can move forward to the analysis of the strategic plan .
 What does then Meridionalism exactly aim at? 
The Brazilian School of Geopolitics has formulated the direction already: 
Brazil should become a great power . Meridionalism aims now at becoming the 
ideology and the strategic plan that leads the movement towards such objective .
Phase I. Analysis of the international environment by Meridionalism
Starting from Brazil’s geohistorical roots, Martin focused on the relevance of 
the influence by the Portuguese16 . In fact, Martin contended that the roots of 
Meridionalism can be traced within the period of foundation of Portugal as 
independent state in the 12th century . 
In spite of Portugal being both a  product of and a  contributor to the 
West, Martin argued that Brazil is neither exclusively a country of the West-
16  Therefore, it is possible to trace a direct link from Therezinha de Castro to Martin (Castro 
1999) . 
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tions” thesis and its division of civilizations –, nor a  tropical country, but 
a meridional one .17 
Martin’s analysis of the environment also included the following statements: 
since the abandonment of Couto e Silva’s plan, Brazil had no other strategic 
plan and Brazilian elites’ perceptions and capacities are too “weak”, compared 
to the state’s potential, which Martin contended is strong enough to overcome 
the limits of a mere regional hegemony in South America or even in Latin 
America (Millennivm 2012) .
Within this context, a  fundamental idea in Martin’s strategic plan is 
that, taking into account that once in history peoples from the “European 
periphery” (Portuguese and Spanish) started a  new phase in the world 
history in terms of balance of power, now peoples from “world periphery” 
(the Southern Hemisphere) should follow the historical example of those 
mentioned peoples (from the “European periphery”) and change the balance 
of powers themselves (Dugin 2014c) .
At this point, it is then obvious that Brazil has a  special role so that 
modifications in the structure of international system may take place . What 
Martin identified as the “zone of impotence” – the South Hemisphere (“warm, 
maritime, and scattered hemisphere”) – is now the part of the world that must 
rise “against the North”, Martin claimed (SimposioPolitica 2013) .
Without any surprise, Martin adopted the rhetoric of neo-Eurasianism 
and argued that, currently, there are only two geo-ideologies on the globe: 
Atlantism “with values of individualism, commerce, democracy, human rights, 
USA as main proponent” and Eurasianism “that results from [the mixture of] 
bolshevism with pan-slavism”, with values attached to agriculture, farms, large 
territorial borders, collectivism, communitarianism, non-individualism, and 
Russia as main proponent (Millennivm 2012, SimposioPolitica 2013) .
Such perspective, attached to the Marxist structure of “struggle for 
liberation” induced then Martin to conclude: “the South is in danger, it is 
necessary to defend it, and Brazil can defend it” (Millennivm 2012) . Moreover, 
Martin also supported the idea of a superiority of the “East” over the “West” – 
something imprecise and that lacks convincing evidence .18
To Martin, without any surprise, the U .S .A . as a state is promoting plans 
for world domination (Martin 2007: 113, Dugin 2014c) – again an imprecise 
argument with short or none empirical verification . Consequently, Martin 
based his Meridionalism on anti-U .S . ground . In fact, in a  critical review 
of Bandeira’s book devoted to the U .S .A ., Martin expressed visibly his anti-
17  Martin relentlessly criticized what he called “the westernizer tendency in Brazilian people 
and elites”, claiming that such propensity is not “fair” towards African and native American in-
fluences (Martin 1994: 115, Martin 2007: 113–114, Dugin 2014c) .
18  Martin gave examples of “East” civilizing the “West” (e .g . Ancient Greece and Phoenicia), 
but other examples could be given in return (e .g . Constantinople was created after and as heir of 
Rome) .
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U .S . perspectives (Martin 2006) . Martin has been proposing an “anti-U .S . 
supremacy” in the world order, and he has been claiming that an “aero-naval 
conflict between Brazil and decadent Atlanticist powers” remains a possibility 
(Conferência Nacional 2013) .
Phase II. Formulation of strategic plan by Meridionalism
In this way, the mission of Meridionalism was already mentioned and can be 
defined as: to change the balance of powers in the world . That corresponds 
to the same mission of neo-Eurasianism, just through other words: the 
destruction of the “unipolar world” .
In order to accomplish that, Martin settled the objective that Brazil needs 
to become a major power on the international arena . So, as neo-Eurasianism 
established the objective of transforming Russia into a major – if not the most 
important – player on the international chessboard, so it did Meridionalism 
concerning Brazil . In a conference devoted to the topic “Brazil in the World 
Scenario”, Martin claimed that “Brazil’s role is crucial for World peace”, and for 
that “Brazil needs to have a «great power plan» clearly defined” . Going even 
beyond those already gigantic objectives, Martin affirmed: “only Brazil can 
save the World” (Martin 2007: 96, SimposioPolitica 2013) .
Concerning the modalities of action, Martin suggested the development 
of military forces and the projection of military power as well as spreading 
an “ideological discourse beyond borders” . The Meridionalist ideology is 
naturally Martin’s proposal, taking into account that he added: “there is no 
projection of power without an international ideology” (e.g. Richelieu’s Raison 
d’État) (Millennivm 2012) .
As for Brazil’s internal plan (relative material state potential), Martin 
proposed what he called the “anti-Golbery plan”: the creation of a great navy 
(in the line of Mahan) and the construction of railways with continental 
dimensions (in the line of Mackinder and Travassos) (Martin 2007: 116, 
Millennivm 2012) .
The true ally of Brazil should be India – these two states should cooperate 
and enter together in the Security Council, Martin formulated (Martin 2007: 
112, Dugin 2014c) . On the other hand, Brazil should also transform IBAS 
into “IBASA”, i.e. bringing Australia into the group (Dugin 2014d) .19 Other 
directions of Brazilian foreign policy shall include Antarctica, Portugal and 
South Africa .
As for Russia and China, because they did never suffer colonialism, Martin 
stated, it is not believed that BRICS is a “geopolitical” project . In this context, 
19  See also: Ministério das Relações Exteriores (2015) . It is interesting to note the conver-
gence with Cohen, who put both Brazil and Australia as “high” second-order powers (Cohen 
2009: 49) .
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Martin characterized BRICS as a geoeconomic structure only (Martin 2007: 
111, SimposioPolitica 2013) . 
Coming back to the objective, linking it with the modalities of action, 
there is a major inconsistency in Martin’s project that needs to be highlighted . 
On the one hand, Martin made use of nationalist rhetoric praising a possible 
bright role for Brazil in the future,20 as it was above-mentioned . On the other 
hand, and absorbing the most misguided influences from the Brazilian School 
of Geopolitics, Martin has been insisting in the project of regional integration, 
which logically dissolves Brazil in the region (Martin 2007: 118) .
As it was analyzed, in strategic terms, regional integration of Latin America 
has been an obstacle for Brazil’s projection as a sea power . Martin claimed that 
Brazil needs to become a sea power, but at the same time he alluded to the 
“Great Bolivarian Fatherland” (Martin 2010: 37), which means the destruction 
of Brazil as independent state . 
If it is true that Martin sustained that Meridionalism does not aim at 
the “integration of countries”, but articulation of states (Martin 1994: 
119), it is also true that Martin seemed cheerful about the velocity of the 
South American integration process until now, mentioning that the idea of 
a  common currency and common military forces in South America is an 
idea on the order of the day for discussion . In this vein, Martin affirmed: 
”…all ideological forces are unanimous in the defense of that, so-called, 
common interest .” (Martin 2010: 49) 
20  In the line of the Brazilian School of Geopolitics (also revealing interest in Antarctica) .
Map 5. 
Martin’s geographical 
directions of his 
Meridionalist ‘geo-ideology’ 
(Martin 2007: 112)
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It seems that Martin disremembers that Brazil does not have balanced 
representation of different ideological standpoints at the Parliament, and 
certainly a  right-wing force would not be willing to support measures of 
weakening national sovereignty .21 
All the same, Martin touched the core of the problem while commenting 
that, since Lula da Silva took charge of Brazil’s Presidential Office, Caracas 
and Brasilia joined positions (Martin 2010: 50) – and that is another direct 
empirical evidence of the effectiveness of São Paulo Forum’s directives .
Hence, the logical inconsistency remains: either Brazil shall become an 
independent state projecting power on the sea as maritime country, or Brazil 
shall be dissolved in South and Latin America within the regional integration 
project . The analysis insists on this point .
Conflicting with the idea of regional integration, in the logics of opposition 
sea power vs. land power – an opposition accepted by Martin due to his use of 
neo-Eurasianist rhetoric – remains the project of Brazil as maritime power .
As quoted, this idea found several supporters in the Brazilian School of 
Geopolitics (e.g. Flores 1972) and Martin – although incoherently because 
of his support to regional integration – is another proponent of that goal .
Martin proclaimed Brazil’s “Atlantic vocation” (Martin 1994: 115, Martin 
2010: 45)22 apparently without realizing that another conflict of ideas is being 
created: if Brazil shall become a sea power, Brazil cannot, at the same time, 
join Eurasianist “land project”, otherwise Meridionalism would become 
a “geo-ideology” of the seas, thus an Atlantist ideology .
So, while Martin explained in detail his rejection of the U .S . hegemony and the 
Atlantist project, claiming that Brazil can join forces with the Eurasianist project, 
simultaneously, Martin contended that “only naval powers can threat Brazilian 
security, since regional integration is decreasing territorial threats” (Millennivm 
2012), thus Brazil must rise as sea power in name of its own defense .23
In terms of sectoral policies, Meridionalism did not provide much 
information . Martin just detailed, in his project, that using diplomatic and 
political instruments to apply the ideology of Meridionalism is essential, in 
order to spread the ideology not only regionally, but like all ideologies, to 
spread it on the globe and become universal (Martin 1994: 118) . 
By his writing style and his conclusions, there is no doubt that Martin 
tries to analyze international relations seriously . However, his Marxist mental 
structure, (“Marxist Geopolitics”) (Martin 2007: 12) does not allow him 
to pursue a-ideological studies as a  (scientific) geopolitical study must be . 
Martin’s normative approach, his judgments of value do not let the reader free 
21  See positions of the member of Brazilian Federal Congress Jair Bolsonaro (e.g. JP Madeira 2014) .
22  Furthermore, Martin’s main study about geopolitics (Martin 2007) opens with a quota-
tion about the importance of the sea .
23  Meridionalism is, in fact, confusing on this issue, because it characterized Brazil as “hy-
brid” power (Martin 2007: 116) .
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whatsoever, since that possibility is denied by Martin (as it is denied by Dugin) . 
The  Marxist structure – and the expression includes neo-Marxist critical 
theory of international relations, etc . – is deeply committed with modifying 
the international system, instead of analyzing it in theoretical and abstract 
ways . Exactly the same problem was identified in neo-Eurasianism .
Martin insisted that ideology has a  purpose of guiding foreign policy 
(Millennivm 2012), whereas it is exactly the opposite: when foreign policy ignores 
geopolitical studies’ results in the name of ideology, state’s failures happen .24 
Other inconsistencies and flaws in Martin’s Meridionalism were already 
identified: the priority falls upon regional integration or upon independent 
maritime power? Is Brazil perceived as a land power or a sea power? How can 
Brazil affirm an Atlantic vocation and become a sea power at the same time 
being an ally of the Eurasianist forces, fighting against Atlantism and against 
the main world sea power, the U .S .A .? Ideology versus science: Meridionalism 
as a  geo-ideology uses the geographical setting (Dugin 2014c), but it is 
incompatible with the practice of science .
In conclusion, in an interview conducted by some of his students, Martin 
defined, with no space for doubts, that Meridionalism constitutes the “theory 
for emancipation of states from the South Hemisphere”, and he confirmed also 
that Meridionalism may join forces with neo-Eurasianism (Matos 2013) . 
Therefore, the main argument of this article, stressing that there is a strong 
tendency of Meridionalism being used by neo-Eurasianism, now as well as in 
the future, if variables do not change, was duly supported .
Conclusion
The article assessed that both neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism are put 
together into a  joined “movement” with the purpose of gathering as much 
support as possible against the West and, most of all, against the U .S .A . 
The final mission of those two strategic plans is to destroy what they claim 
to be the “unipolar world” through a very biased analysis of the international 
chessboard . In other words, the article identified a common enemy both to 
neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism that makes diverse (and antagonist) 
objectives, modalities of action and sectoral policies come together into 
a unified strategic movement of world dimensions . That dynamics of joining 
forces can be easily explained by the basic theoretical core that a strategy is 
always formulated against some “other” (Beaufre 1965) .
Although both strategic plans suggested the creation of a multipolar world, 
a more thoughtful investigation uncovered the goal of creating an oligarchic-
24  Still, Martin himself recognized at the end that, in international politics, geography is 
more important than ideology (Martin 2007: 10) .
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global order instead, especially in regard to neo-Eurasianism . Furthermore, 
the Russian intelligence community was acknowledged as the agent to 
operationalize the neo-Eurasianist project under Dugin’s direct formulations .
In that oligarchic-global order, and with respect to South America, 
the national identity of Brazil would not be respected, since the purpose 
is to dissolve South (or even Latin) American countries’ identities into 
a homogeneous region to be used as instrument in the global neo-Eurasianist 
strategy in pursuing its final mission .
In this context, both South American regional integration and the Meridionalist 
ideology and strategic plan have been giving a hand to neo-Eurasianism, and the 
article predicts it will continue so, if the variables remain the same . 
With respect to Meridionalism, it seems that the task of formulating and 
operationalizing the strategic plan has been falling upon ideology . Thus, the 
internationalist leftist hegemony in Brazil has been reigning over the thinking 
about Brazil’s strategy . Meridionalism is a branch of that leftist hegemony in the 
sense that it is partly internationalist and devoted to Latin American regional 
integration . Consequently, the influence of São Paulo Forum – which gathers 
all leftist movements and parties in South America with the goal of achieving 
a  Latin American bloc – can be deduced in Brazilian politics (even against 
Brazil’s national interests, as the contradictions within Meridionalism disclose) . 
Moreover, if that leftist ideological predominance is real, then 
Meridionalism, alike neo-Eurasianism, cannot be assessed as a  geopolitical 
study about the essence of the reality, but simple as a product of an ideology 
committed to the Marxist aphorism of “changing the World” . 
In this context, it is that same ideological milieu, harmful from a scientific 
point of view, which creates inconsistencies in Meridionalism that the article 
identified and that can be systematized in two groups: an opposition between 
an independent Brazil versus Latin American regional integration and an 
opposition between Brazil as a sea power versus an alliance with Eurasianist 
land power bloc (within the land/sea clash that is accepted by Meridionalism) .
Neo-Eurasianism is committed to a project for a New World Order . The 
empirical data collected and explained in this article allow sustaining that 
notion with convincing evidence . Besides, also Meridionalism is dedicated to 
a similar project for a New World Order . In this context, the conclusion can 
be resumed in one sentence: both projects have connections in both academic 
and strategic terms .
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